Philosophy of Perception

PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION 4

Philosophyof Perception

Theconcern of the philosophy of perception is to bring out the status ofperceptual data as well as the perceptual experience. Philosophy ofperception, in more specific terms, brings out the relationshipbetween the beliefs and knowledge of the world to the perceptualexperience and status (Fish, 2010). To understand the perceptionaccount explicitly, it is critical to have a commitment to aparticular metaphysical view among the available ones. In thisregard, theories of perception have been set to explain thephilosophy of perception. Among these various theories of philosophy,this paper discusses on why the indirect reductive realism theory isthe most likely true theory of perception.

Thetrue theory of philosophy of perception

Theindirect reductive realism theory possessing non-reductive colorrealism regarding the external green color is the true theory andstates that the green color evident on a tree is not just how greencolor appears but is exactly how green color looks like. Theexplanation of this theory stems from the fact that even in a darkplace, it is still clear in our minds that a tree has a green color.This is the most likely true theory of perception because it bringsout an explanation that the color we see is not just an illusion ofthe mind but is the true color of the object. Taking for instance,the color green on a tree, cannot be an illusion because it is thesame color evident even during darkness. This implies that the greencolor we see is not just an illusion of creation of a green color inour mind but rather because of a creation of green image in ourbrains using colorless electromagnetic radiations, and as wellresults in creation of the green color on the tree (O’Brian, 2016).This explanation shows that there exists a reliable connectionbetween the observable green on trees and the formation of greenimages on our minds.

Thedirect realism about color perception stipulates that the perceivingof a green tree is as a result of direct access from the personperceiving the tree to the tree itself (Fish, 2010). This is untruebecause we cannot simply have direct access to a green imageperceived to float in the mind of the perceiver. The indirect realismon color perception with an elimination regarding external colorstates that the fact that we perceive the tree as green is anillusion in our minds and that the tree is neither green nor anyother color is not true because if that was the case, the color wouldbe changing during different incidents depending on the particularillusion on our mind at that particular time (O’Brian, 2016). Theindirect reductive realism theory is false because it states that thegreen color we see is not just an illusion but the exact green coloreven if that is what a non-green color looks like. This is falsebecause the theory is confusing and does not bring a clearexplanation of green color. Lastly, intentionalism theory speculatesthat no green color is evident on a tree, there is never a greenimage floating in our brains, but there is a firm belief that thetree is green (O’Brian, 2016). This does not imply the belief isnot an image floating in our brains but, the belief helps us have aparticular perception of an image. This is false because theperception about green color requires a more substantive elaboration.

Conclusion

Philosophyof perception helps us understand the phenomenon surrounding anobject as the eyes observe it. Various theories help us identify thedifferent ways in which we perceive an object as well as its color.The explanation above shows indirect reductive realism theorypossessing non-reductive color realism regarding the external greencolor as the most likely true theory in explaining the philosophy ofperception.

References

Fish,W. (2010). Philosophyof perception. NewYork: Routledge.

O’Brian,D. (2016). Objectsof perception. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved13 March 13, 2016, from http://www.ieb.utm.edu/perc-obj/#SH4a.